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It is widely perceived that globalization is a threat to tax financed public sector activities. The 
argument is that public activities (public consumption and transfers) financed by income taxes 
may distort labour markets and cause higher wages and thus a loss of competitiveness. If the 
importance of the latter effect is reinforced by globalization, it is inferred that the marginal 
costs of public funds increase and a retrenchment of the public sector follows. We consider 
this issue in a Ricardian trade model in which production and specialization structures are 
endogenous. Even though income taxation unambiguously worsens wage competitiveness, it 
does not follow that tax distortions or marginal costs of public funds increase with product 
market integration. The reason is that gains from trade tend to reduce both. Moreover, non-
cooperative fiscal policies do not have a bias towards retrenchment due to a positive terms of 
trade effect from taxation. 
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Is globalization a threat to an extended welfare state relying on a large public sector and therefore
high tax burdens? Popular debates are widely based on the premise that the answer is aﬃrmative,
and in policy debates the pressure for retrenchment is often highlighted. Despite this strong
perception, it is an empirical fact that when globalization is measured by the trade share, one
ﬁnds a tendency that more globalized economies have larger public sectors (see e.g. Rodrik (1998)).
The debate on the globalization threat to the public sector focuses on two issues pertaining
to tax ﬁnancing of public sector activities. One mechanism is increased factor mobility forcing
tax reductions on the mobile factors and thus causing a revenue drag1. This can be interpreted
as a direct threat to the public sector in the sense that the market enforces a change in poli-
cies (see e.g. Tanzi (2000) and Razin and Sadka (2005)). However, it is a fact that the larger
share of tax revenue accrues from direct and indirect taxation of labour income, and since labour
mobility has not seemed to increase signiﬁcantly2, it follows that the direct revenue eﬀects are
moderate. This does not preclude that there are eﬀects on the tax system since the tax structure
would have to be adapted to this situation3, but it suggests that this mechanism is not causing a
fundamental threat to a tax ﬁnanced public sector. An important issue is whether globalization
increases tax distortions in labour markets. Thus, if that is the case, tax ﬁnancing may remain
feasible, but it will become more costly and hence less attractive (for given policy preferences).
A key tax distortion arises through the eﬀect taxation may have on labour supply and thus wage
competitiveness, which in turn has implications for production and employment (see e.g. Alesina
and Perotti (1997)). This channel of tax distortions may have been strengthened because glob-
alization makes it easier to relocate production and thus employment across countries. In short,
globalization may increase the tax distortions and thus the marginal costs of public funds.
Most discussions of these issues are based on partial equilibrium reasoning. However, this is
potentially misleading since the general equilibrium eﬀects of market integration are very impor-
tant, and it is from these that the aggregate gains from international integration derive. This
is very important in the present context since gains from international integration are reﬂected
in higher income, consumption etc., which in turn can have important implications for both the
distortionary eﬀects of taxation and the optimal level of public activities. In this paper, we show
that common perceptions on how ﬁscal policy aﬀects wage competitiveness are supported by the
general equilibrium analysis. However, the inference often made in terms of implications for tax
1For evidence on such downward competitiveness on taxes, see e.g. EAAG (2007)
2A signiﬁcant increase in migration coupled with selection mechanisms resulting in net-inﬂow of less skilled and
net-outﬂow of highly skilled will obviously be a serious threat to a tax ﬁnanced welfare model.
3The so-called dual income taxation scheme adopted in the Scandinavian countries, which allows a separation of
taxation of labour income and capital income, makes it possible to combine a high and progressive labour income
taxation with a low and proportional taxation of capital income.
2distortions, marginal costs of public funds and the direction in which policies will be changed as
a result of product market integration are not. The basic reason is that the eﬀects running via
competitiveness are countered by eﬀects which basically originate from the fact that integration
leads to gains from trade. Hence, the very basic argument for further integration has important
and surprising implications for ﬁscal policy responses.
We consider a general equilibrium setting allowing for an endogenous determination of pro-
duction, specialization and thus trade structure across countries. Product market integration
is modelled as reductions in trade frictions, which in turn imply that the non-tradeable sector
shrinks and that there is reallocation of production and employment according to comparative
advantages and thus gains from specialization. The public sector ﬁnances public consumption
(service provision) and transfers via an income tax. In this general equilibrium setting, we analyse
how ﬁscal policy aﬀects various key variables including wage competitiveness, and we consider the
optimal determination of both transfers and public consumption. We discuss how the eﬀects of
ﬁscal policy and the optimal policy response (for given policy objectives) change in the wake of
further international integration. One pertinent question is: Does globalization necessarily lead
to a retrenchment of public sector activities? We also address whether the "competitiveness ef-
fect" causes countries acting non-cooperatively to chose a too low level of public sector activities
relative to the cooperative case to attain a competitive edge; i.e. is there a "race to the bottom"
mechanism? It turns out that neither of the answers are aﬃrmative.
The present paper merges elements from trade theory, macroeconomics and public economics.
Ricardian models have recently been widely used to analyse the eﬀects of international inte-
gration since this framework allows for an endogenous determination of production, trade and
specialization structure depending on trade frictions as a metric of market integration. Since
globalization driven by both political and technological changes lowers trade frictions, it follows
that this framework captures essential elements of the changes and eﬀects associated with the
globalization process. This literature builds on Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977), and
recent contributions include e.g. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), Eaton and Kortum (2002),
Bernard et al. (2003), and Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2004).
The issue of ﬁscal policy in open economies has been extensively studied both in the macroeco-
nomic and public economics literature. Most closely related to the present paper is the literature
addressing international interdependencies in ﬁscal policy in explicitly formulated general equilib-
rium models. The standard set-up has featured specialized production; that is, countries specialize
in production of speciﬁc commodities. The production structure is exogenous, and hence although
there is trade, the trade and specialization structure is invariant to both policy changes and in-
tegration. One surprising but robust ﬁnding in these models is that ﬁscal policies tend to be too
expansionary when comparing the non-cooperative to the cooperative policy outcome (see e.g.
Chari and Kehoe (1990), Devereux (1991), Turnovsky (1988) and van der Ploeg (1987, 1988)).
3The reason is a terms-of-trade or “beggar thy neighbour” eﬀect. Fiscal policy in the form of
demand for domestically produced goods tends to shift demand from foreign to domestic products
(home-bias), which in turn is perceived to improve the terms of trade and thus the real income
of the home country. No such terms-of-trade eﬀect arises in the (symmetric) cooperative case,
and therefore non-cooperative policies tend to be too expansionary4. This result holds also in
the presence of distortions, implying an ineﬃciently low level of activity and therefore a potential
role for ﬁscal policy in expanding activity and employment (Andersen, Rasmussen and Sørensen
(1996)). As noted, this literature relies on a home-bias in public consumption and an exogenous
production/specialization structure. Relaxing both assumptions, our model supports the result
that a terms-of-trade eﬀect implies an expansionary bias in non-cooperative ﬁscal policy5.
The paper is organized as follows: The basic structure of the Ricardian trade model with
trade frictions and a public sector is laid out in section 2, and section 3 characterizes the general
equilibrium to the model. Eﬀects of ﬁscal policy changes and tax distortions are analysed in
section 4, while section 5 considers the case of transfers only and the marginal costs of public
funds. Section 6 analyses the optimal level of public consumption (service provision), and section
7 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 A two-country model
We set up a two-country model. Both countries ﬁnance public consumption and transfers by
a proportional income tax. Given trade frictions and comparative advantages, the trade and
specialization structures are endogenously determined. Production factors are perfectly mobile
within countries but cannot move across borders.
Households
The representative household derives utility from private (B) and public (G) utility bundles
U (B,G) (1)
The private utility bundle consists of private consumption C and leisure 1−L (time endowment
minus work), i.e.6
B ≡ C + V (1 − L)
The public utility bundle consists of services provided by the public sector to all households. The
4Irrespective of whether the policy in absolute terms is expansionary or contractionary.
5In Andersen (2007), a related framework is considered in which wage setting is modelled in such a way that
public activities may have a direct eﬀect to moderate wages for given employment; e.g. via day care facilities. In
this setting, non-cooperative policies may have a downward bias.
6A more general formulation is considered in appendix A.
4U-, V − and H-functions are all increasing and concave.7
The utility from private consumption is deﬁned by an indirect utility function (homothetic
preferences8)
C = φ(Q)I
where Q denotes the price vector for the continuum of goods indexed by i ∈ [0,1], and I denotes
disposable income.
Households own the ﬁrms and therefore receive proﬁt income in addition to their labour income.
A proportional tax t is levied on all forms of income. Disposable income I is thus given as
I = [1 − t][WL + Π] + TR (2)
where W denotes the wage rate, Π proﬁts and TR lump-sum transfers from the public sector.
A key property of homothetic preferences is that expenditure shares are independent of in-
come and therefore depend only on prices Q. In fact, the expenditure shares are homogenous of
degree zero in the price vector. Denoting consumption of commodity i by Ci , we have that the




We assume that expenditure shares are diﬀerentiable in the price vector Q.
Labour supply is determined from the ﬁrst order condition
φ(Q)W [1 − t] = V
′(1 − L
s) (3)
implying that labour supply can be written9
L
s = S(φ(Q)W [1 − t]),
∂S
∂φ(Q)W [1 − t]
> 0 (4)
The household structure in the foreign country is similar - with all variables indexed by ∗ to
denote that they apply to the foreign country.
Producers
Product markets have perfect competition, and ﬁrms produce subject to constant returns to
scale production functions with labour as the only input (Yi = AiLi), cf. the standard Ricardian
trade model.10 Commodity speciﬁc productivities diﬀer across countries. For each good i, let Ai
and A∗
i denote domestic and foreign productivity in producing commodity i, respectively, and let
7We further assume that limL→1 V ′
1−L (1 − L) = ∞, limL→0 V ′
1−L(1 − L) = 0 and limG→0 UG(B,G) = ∞ to
avoid corner solutions.
8The properties of the indirect utility function (see e.g. Varian(1978)) include that: i) φ is homogenous of degree
−1 in Q, ii) C is homogeneous of degree zero in Q and I , and iii) φ is decreasing in Q.
9The quasi-linear preference relation implies that there is no income eﬀect in labour supply.




i be relative productivity. Assume without loss of generality that commodities are ordered
such that ai is increasing in i. The main interest in the paper is to explore how public sector
activities aﬀect the equilibrium and how this interacts with product market integration. To avoid
mixing this up with other possible eﬀects and sources of asymmetries, we impose the following
assumption:




Trade involves various frictions in the form of explicit or implicit trade costs (Samuelson’s
iceberg costs12). In order to deliver one unit of commodity i on the export market z(m) ≥ 1,zm <
0, units have to be shipped oﬀ; i.e. z captures a friction in international trade of commodities.
Trade frictions are assumed to be symmetric with respect to the direction of trade. We use m as
an indicator of market integration reducing the impediment (z) to trade. An increase in m thus
captures further product market integration. Note that nobody - at home or foreign - attains any
income from the friction.
Prices charged by domestic and foreign ﬁrms are13




















), and given constant marginal costs, the winner takes all. The critical condition
determining which ﬁrm supplies the market is thus W
Ai ⋚ zW∗
A∗
i or w ⋚ aiz, where w = W
W∗ denotes
the relative wage. Since relative productivity ai increases in i, there exists a critical value of i
(iH) deﬁned by w ≡ zaiH with the property that for all i ≥ iH, good i is produced domestically.14
Similarly, there is a critical value of i (iE > iH) deﬁned by w ≡ z−1aiE with the property that for
all i > iE, good i is only produced domestically and exported to the foreign market. Hence, goods
i < iH are imported, iH ≤ i ≤ iE are non-tradeables, and i > iE are exportables. Figure 1 below
summarizes.
11To ensure diﬀerentiability, we assume that the distribution has no mass points.
12Modelling trade frictions as Iceberg trade frictions simpliﬁes the model as we avoid including a transport sector.
13The prices follow from the assumption of competitive ﬁrms producing with constant returns to scale production
functions with labour as the only input.
Due to trade frictions, domestic (foreign) consumers have no incentive to buy goods in the foreign (domestic)
market.
14This implies that for all i < iH, good i is only produced by foreign ﬁrms.
6We have that15
iE = iE(w,m) ∂iE
∂w > 0 ∂iE
∂m < 0
iH = iH(w,m) ∂iH
∂w > 0 ∂iH
∂m > 0
(6)
Higher relative wages imply higher iE and iH, that is, domestic ﬁrms both produce and export
fewer types of goods. The intuition is straightforward since it derives from the worsening of wage
competitiveness. The more integrated the markets (higher m and thus lower z), the higher iH
and the lower iE; i.e. with lower trade frictions, fewer goods are produced domestically, but more
goods are exported. In other words, the number of non-tradeable goods decreases. Hence, changes
in both wage competitiveness (endogenous) and the trade friction (exogenous) cause a change in
the trade and specialization structure.
Government
The government may provide lump-sum transfers (TR) and public services (G) to households.
Public services are produced by use of labour (Lg), and it is assumed16 that G = Lg (productivity
is constant and for simplicity normalized to one). These activities are ﬁnanced by a proportional
tax levied on income17 by the rate t, and hence the budget constraint reads
t[WL + Π] = WL
g + TR (7)
where L is total employment, i.e. L ≡ Lp + Lg, where Lp (Lg) denotes labour used in the private
(public) sector.
To allow for a ﬂexible way of capturing that the government may have diﬀerent priorities
between its two main activities (transfers and service provision), we denote by ξ ∈ [0,1] the
fraction of the tax revenue spent on lump-sum transfers to individuals, and the other part is used
for public service provision. For ξ = 1 we have a pure tax-transfer scheme without any aggregate
demand eﬀects, but only a supply side eﬀect via the way the tax rate aﬀects labour supply. This
15Trade can only occur in equilibrium if a1 > z (m). As we are interested in open economy equilibria, we assume
this condition to be fulﬁlled.
16The assumption implies that public activities are directed towards a non-tradeable, namely labour. Notice that
the assumption here to a ﬁrst approximation capture the fact that about 2/3 of public consumption expenditures
are wage expenditures.
17Observe that there is no proﬁt in equilibrium due to competitive product markets, and there is no issue as to
whether labour and proﬁt income should be taxed at diﬀerent rates.
7special case allows an identiﬁcation of the pure distortion eﬀect without mixing it up with other
eﬀects of public sector activities.
Using the public sector budget constraint and the fact that proﬁts are zero in equilibrium
allows us to write disposable income as
I = [1 − t]WL + Π + TR = WL
p
i.e. disposable income is determined by the income generated in the private sector18. Using that




1 − [1 − ξ]t
L
p (8)
3 Equilibrium wages and gains from trade
Although the model features many aspects, a considerable simpliﬁcation is achieved by the fact
that all endogenous variables can be written as functions of the relative wage w, and we can
characterize the general equilibrium by the labour market equilibrium condition, which turns
out to be equivalent to the balanced trade condition. Details are given in Appendix B. For the






where the ﬁrst part uses the homogeneity of the φ-function, and the second part the relation
between prices and wages (see Appendix B). The real wage increases in the relative wage (w) and








M (w,m) be the import share, i.e. the fraction of income domestic households spend on
foreign goods. Further integration leaves an ambiguous eﬀect on the import share since import
prices decrease while import volumes increase. We make the following assumption19 ensuring that
import shares increase with integration (the empirically relevant case).
Assumption 2: The import shares ψ
M (w,m) and ψ
∗M (w,m) increase with market integration
(m).
Lemma 1 The home (foreign) import share increases (decreases) in the relative wage w
18Note that gross domestic product as conventionally measured in national accounts is given as (measured from
the factor side)
GDP = WLp + WLg
19In a formulation where preferences exhibit a constant elasticity of substitution between any two goods, a
suﬃcient condition to ensure that Assumption 2 is true is that the elasticity of substitution exceeds one.




















Hence, it follows directly from Assumption 2 that ψ
M (w,m) increases in w and ψ
∗M (w,m) de-
creases in w.
Labour supply can in equilibrium be written S([1 − t]Φ(w,m)), and it follows that labour sup-
plied to the private sector becomes Sp (w,t,ξ,m) ≡ [1 − [1 − ξ]t]S (Φ(w,m)[1 − t]), and public
employment is Sg (w,t,ξ,m) ≡ [1 − ξ]tS (Φ(w,m)[1 − t]). From the labour market equilibrium,
we have
Proposition 2 Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. The equilibrium condition to











For t < 1 and t∗ < 1 the equilibrium relative wage exists, and it is uniquely determined from (10)




Proof. The equilibrium condition follows from Appendix B. Let w and w be deﬁned by
iH (w,m) = 0 and iE (w,m) = 1 where w >w as a1 > z by assumption.   is continuous
in w. We have  (w,t,ξ,t∗,ξ
∗,m) = −ψ
∗M (w,m)Sp∗ (w,t∗,ξ
∗,m) < 0 and  (w,t,ξ,t∗,ξ
∗,m)
= ψ
M (w,m)Sp (w,t,ξ,m)w > 0. Hence, there exist a w ∈ (w,w) such that  (w,t,ξ,t∗,ξ
∗,m) =
0. This proves existence. From Lemma 1, (4) and (9) it follows that   is strictly increasing in w,
i.e.  w > 0, which proves uniqueness.
3.1 Symmetric countries - gains from trade
As a prelude to the subsequent analysis, it is useful to note that lower trade frictions are associated
with gains from trade. Considering the symmetric equilibrium where ﬁscal policies are the same
in the two countries, i.e. t = t∗ and ξ = ξ
∗ and thus w = 1.
Proposition 3 In a symmetric equilibrium a reduction in trade frictions increases welfare for
given ﬁscal policy (t,ξ).




p(1,ξ,t,m) + V (1 −
Sp(1,ξ,t,m)
1 − [1 − ξ]t
),
[1 − ξ]t








































Note that Φm > 0 cf. (9), Sp
m > 0 cf. (4) and (9) and 1−t
1−[1−ξ]t ∈ [0,1]. Hence, it follows that
∂Υ
∂m > 0.
The utility gain has two components: increasing private (B) and public (G) utility bundles.
The former captures standard gains from trade. The latter arises because one of the gains from
integration is higher employment, which in turn means higher tax revenue and therefore (under
the balance budget constraint) more public sector activities. Alternatively, to maintain a given
level of public services, there would be room for a tax reduction, which in turn would increase the
private utility bundle further.
4 Fiscal policy and competitiveness
Much debate on the public sector focuses on how public sector activities aﬀect the competitiveness
of the economy. We have:
Proposition 4 An unilateral increase in the tax rate (t) raises the relative wage (w) and thus
deteriorates wage competitiveness.


















The sign follows from noting S
p
t < 0 cf. (4) and (8),  w > 0 cf. the proof of Proposition 2.
This conﬁrms the common perception that an increase in the tax rate tends to increase relative
wages, and thereby worsen wage competitiveness (see e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1997)). The
increase in the relative wage causes a reduction in both the number of commodities exported and
produced in the domestic country, i.e. iE and iH increase, cf. ﬁgure 1.
In popular debates, it is often asserted that it is not the absolute level of taxes (size of the
public sector) but taxes relative to taxes in competing countries that matter. The intuition is that
competition is a relative matter. It is an implication of the present model that
10Proposition 5 The relative wage is independent of the absolute level of taxes and the composition
of public expenditures when countries are symmetric, i.e. w is invariant to t and ξ if t = t∗ and
ξ = ξ
∗. However, the private sector employment level is falling in t (for given ξ) and increasing
in ξ (for given t).
Proof. When countries are symmetric w = 1. The eﬀects on private sector employment follow
from (4) and (8)
While the present setting supports that only the relative wage matters for competitiveness and
trade/specialization structure, it does not support that only the relative tax matters. The reason
is that two margins are aﬀected by taxes: ﬁrst, the margin between foreign and domestically
produced goods, which is aﬀected only by the relative wage, and second the margin between
consumption and leisure. Hence, the standard closed economy distortions remain with symmetric
public sector sizes/structures (see also Proposition 7, below) although neither the trade structure
nor relative wages are aﬀected by a symmetric change in the tax rate.
The relative wage and thus competitiveness is a poor indicator of the welfare and employment
eﬀects of given changes in exogenous variables. The reason is that e.g. employment is aﬀected
both by the change in relative wages but also directly by the underlying cause for a change in the
relative wage.
Cross-country variations in the size and composition of the public sector activities are large. In
policy debates, it is often taken for granted that a large public sector is tantamount to a worsening
of the competitive position, and partial models conﬁrm this. With the present framework, we can
analyse two key asymmetries, namely, diﬀerences in size and composition of the public sector.
Proposition 6 Size: If t > t∗ and ξ = ξ
∗, i.e. the domestic public sector is more extended than
the foreign, but the relative composition (services and transfers) is the same, it follows that w > 1
















∂w > 0 and
ψM(1,m)







0 cf. (4) and (9) and
Sp∗(1,ξ,t∗,m)
Sp(1,ξ,t,m) > 1 cf. (4) and (8). It follows that w > 1.
Intuitively a large domestic (relative to foreign) tax burden causes a lower domestic labour
supply, and this tends to increase the relative wage. Notice that this implies that more goods are
imported and less are exported (compared to the symmetric case), but whether the non-tradeable
sector expands or shrinks is ambiguous, i.e. both iE and iH,increase cf. ﬁgure 1. Moreover, it is
an implication that domestic production is more concentrated on the activities for which it has a
11strong comparative advantage. Note also that the relative price of exportables increase, i.e. there
is a terms of trade eﬀect muting the loss of production of some tradeables.
Turning to the composition, we have
Proposition 7 Composition: If ξ > ξ
∗ and t = t∗, i.e. the domestic public sector is relatively
more focused on transfers than on public services compared to foreign, but the size of the public
sector is the same, it follows that w < 1.
















∂w > 0 and
ψM(1,m)






< 0 cf. above and
Sp∗(1,ξ∗,t,m)
Sp(1,ξ,t,m) < 1
cf. (8). It follows that w < 1.
When a country focuses more on transfers than on provision of public services, the labour re-
quirement of the public sector is lower (compared to foreign). The lower public labour requirement
increases labour supply for the private sector and thereby reduces the relative wage. Consequently,
more goods are exported and fewer imported, i.e. iEand iH decrease cf. ﬁgure 1. The eﬀect on the
size of the non-tradeables sector is ambiguous but the terms of trade deteriorate in this case. The
proposition can be seen as stressing that the eﬀects of public activities and taxes depend critically
on what the tax revenue is spend on.
These propositions show that both size and composition of ﬁscal policy are important for
competitiveness.
In the present setting, the root of the distortion is the tax wedge aﬀecting the labour supply.
A metric of the importance of tax distortions which is useful in later analyses is the diﬀerence
between labour supply (S) without and with taxation, i.e.
￿ S ≡ S |t=0 −S |t>0> 0







Proposition 8 Tax distortions and integration: In symmetric equilibria, tax distortions are
increasing in the tax rate, ∂￿ S

















12Proof. The tax distortion is in symmetric equilibria where t = t∗ and w = 1 given by




= SΦ[1−t]Φ(1,m) > 0











































































The essence of this result is that there is a direct eﬀect which unambiguously implies that
marginal tax distortions increase with integration, and there is an ambiguously signed indirect
eﬀect. Consider ﬁrst the direct eﬀect captured by the ﬁrst term on the RHS of (12). The higher
the integration (m), the larger the real wage before tax (Φ),Φm > 0, and therefore the larger the
real wage reduction induced by a given tax rate. That is, the employment loss due to higher
taxation (measured by the labour supply elasticity) is larger, and therefore this works in the
direction of increasing marginal tax distortions with more integration. The indirect eﬀect is more
complicated since it relates to whether we, as a result of integration, move to a part of the labour
supply relation which is more or less elastic. To see this, note that a lower trade friction increases
the after-tax real wage, and therefore we move up the labour supply relation. If
∂ηS
∂Φ[1−t] > 0, the
labour supply function is more elastic at a higher wage rate which tends to make the tax increase
more distortionary, and vice versa if it becomes less elastic, i.e.
∂ηS
∂Φ[1−t] < 0. In the former case,
the indirect eﬀect goes in the same direction as the direct eﬀect, and we have that more market






∂Φ[1−t] < 0, we have an ambiguity between the direct and the indirect eﬀect. This
ambiguity will always arise for some wage rate. To see this, notice that
∂ηS
∂Φ[1−t] < 0 for a suﬃciently
high real wage20. To put it diﬀerently, for a suﬃciently high wage rate, the labour supply relation
becomes inelastic since there is an upper bound (time limit) to how much labour can be supplied.
To sum up, it is not possible to conclude unambiguously on how product market integration aﬀects
marginal tax distortions.
Figure 2: Example: Non-monotone distortion eﬀect of product market integration
The result reported above suggests that the eﬀect of integration on marginal tax distortions
may not be monotone. Consider ﬁgure 2 where the labour supply elasticity is falling in the wage
rate, i.e.
∂ηS
∂Φ[1−t] < 0 for all Φ(1 − t), and labour supply has an upward bound (= 1). In this case,
it follows21 that the marginal distortion is hump-shaped in integration (m); that is, at ﬁrst more
integration will increase marginal tax distortions, but when trade frictions are lowered to a certain
level, marginal tax distortions will be falling with integration, cf. ﬁgure 2.
5 Optimal transfers and the marginal costs of public funds
In the present set-up, the transfer part of public sector activities seems trivial as the representative
household framework precludes any welfare gains from redistribution. Yet, restricting public sector
activities to transfers (ξ = 1) is interesting since it highlights the distortionary eﬀects of taxation
without mixing them up with other eﬀects of public sector activities.
When public sector revenue ﬁnances a transfer only (ξ = 1), there is no public employment,
i.e. Sg = 0, Sp = S. The problem of choosing the optimal tax rate (t) under the constraint that
20We have ηS ≥ 0. Since L → 1 for Φ[1 − t] → ∞, implying V ′ → ∞, it follows that ηS → 0 for Φ[1 − t] → ∞,
hence
∂ηS
∂Φ[1−t] < 0 over some interval for the after-tax real wage.
21Assuming that for z > 1 there exist a value of the after-tax real wage for which S
SΦ(1−t)
∂ηS




∂Φ[1−t] decreases in Φ[1 − t].




Υ = U (ΦS + V (1 − S),0) +  
￿
tΦS − ￿ T
￿
,
where   is the Lagrange multiplier measuring the eﬀects on utility of changing the revenue re-
quirement. The ﬁrst order condition reads
UBBt +  [R + tRt] = 0








where R denotes real income generated in the private sector, i.e. R ≡ wφ(Q)S(Φ[1 − t]). The
MCPF thus measures how much real income private households lose if the real income going to
the public sector increases by one unit.
Measures of marginal costs of public funds are often used as both a metric of tax distortions
and inputs in assessing optimal policies (see also below). It is therefore interesting to see how
integration aﬀects the marginal costs of public funds. We consider the direct eﬀect of integration
holding the tax rate constant. Obviously the optimal policy response may be to change the
tax rate, and we return to this question below. Since there are policy spill-overs it follows that
the eﬀect of integration in general diﬀer depending on whether the marginal costs are assessed in
cooperative or non-cooperative equilibrium. In the latter scenario, policy makers take into account
that ﬁscal policy aﬀects the relative wage, and thus competitiveness and terms of trade. Before
addressing these questions, it is worth noting that in the symmetric non-cooperative case the costs
of increasing the revenue constraint in both countries equals those of the cooperative case.
Considering ﬁrst the marginal costs of public funds in the cooperative case, we have

























Proof. In a cooperative equilibrium, we have
Bt = tΦSt = −tΦ
∂￿ S
∂t
Rt = ΦSt = −Φ
∂￿ S
∂t



























In the cooperative case marginal costs of public funds increase (decrease) if further integration
via the implied real wage increase drives the labour market to a more (less) elastic part of the
labour supply curve. The fact that the eﬀects depends only on the properties of the labour supply
relation follows from the observation made in section 3, that only the margin between consumption
and leisure is relevant for tax distortions if the two countries are in a symmetric position which
by deﬁnition is the case in the cooperative case.
It is an implication that MCPF |coop is unaﬀected by integration if the labour supply elasticity
is constant
Corollary 10 Given a constant labour supply elasticity MCPF |coop is invariant to integration
Proof. Set
∂ηS
∂Φ[1−t] = 0 in Proposition 9
In the non-cooperative case where policy makers take into account that ﬁscal policy aﬀects the

















or in terms of elasticities
ηMCPF|non−coop,m = −ληR,m + (λ − 1)ηRt,m + ηBt,m
where ηy,x denotes the elasticity of y wrt. x, and λ ≡ R
R+tRt = 1
ηtR,t > 1.
The direction in which MCPF |non−coop changes when product markets become more inte-
grated features three eﬀects22. Two of these are related to the tax base (R)
i) (tax base). We have that ηR,m > 0, i.e. tighter integration increases real income generated
in the private sector, hence −ληR,m < 0. This eﬀect implies that MCPF |non−coop tends to fall
when trade frictions are lowered. The reason is a tax base eﬀect from integration, namely that
22In our interpretation below, we consider the empirical relevant case with MCPF |non−coop> 0, Rt < 0 and
Bt < 0. This will be the case for a suﬃciently high revenue constraint (ˆ T).
16the tax base for the income tax increases due to gains from trade, and this tends to lower the
marginal costs of public funds.23
ii) (tax base sensitivity). Rt measures how the tax rate aﬀects the real income, and ηRt,m
measures the responsiveness hereof to integration. If a given tax rate reduces the private real
income more with more integration, we have ηRt,m > 0, implying that MCPF |non−coop tends to
increase with further integration (notice λ > 1) and vice versa
iii) (private consumption bundle sensitivity). Bt measures how the tax rate aﬀects the private
utility bundle, and ηBt,m measures the responsiveness hereof to integration. A higher tax rate
reduces the private utility bundle Bt < 0, but is this eﬀect larger or smaller with a larger trade
friction? If a given tax reduces the private utility bundle less with more integration ηBt,m < 0,
implying that MCPF |non−coop tends to decrease when markets are more integrated.
Note that the tax base eﬀect (i) is unambiguously signed, while the latter two are ambiguously
signed. Hence, it is ambiguous whether marginal costs of public funds are increasing or decreasing
with further integration. The decomposition of the change in the marginal costs of public funds
is interesting for several reasons. First, it shows that although there is no factor mobility, and
thus no direct tax base mobility, there is an indirect eﬀect on the tax base. The tax base grows
due to gains from integration, and hence the indirect eﬀect works in the opposite direction of
the much debated direct mobility eﬀect. Second, turning to tax distortions we ﬁnd that there
are separate eﬀects via both real income (R) and the private consumption bundle (B). If taxes
tend to lower both of these, and this eﬀect becomes stronger with more integration, this tends to
increase the marginal costs of public funds. This is the type of eﬀect often highlighted in debates
on how globalization aﬀects the costs of taxation. The present analysis qualiﬁes this debate in
two important respects: i) it is not generally the case that tax distortions on real income and the
private consumption bundle are reinforced by more integration, and ii) even if they are, the overall
eﬀect may still be a decrease in the marginal costs of public funds due to the tax base eﬀect.
Turning to optimal policies (utilitarian policy makers), non-cooperative policies may be biased
relative to cooperative policies. In policy debates, it is often presumed that a concern for com-
petitiveness leads to a downward bias (undercutting or race to the bottom) in public policies. We
now turn to a consideration of this issue.




an additional term, namely UBB
UB ηB,z > 0, would appear in the decomposition of the elasticity. Measuring in utility
terms takes into account that the value of one monetary unit is not the same across equilibria. Intuitively, lower
trade frictions increase the private utility bundle and thereby reduce marginal utility of the private bundle and
thus the value of monetary units. This tends to reduce the marginal costs of public funds. Hence, we have chosen
the more pessimistic measure in the analysis.
Note that the propositions above do not depend on which deﬁnition is used.
17Proposition 11 Evaluated for the same tax rate, the marginal costs of public funds are larger in
the cooperative than in the non-cooperative case iﬀ tax revenues in the two cases move in the same
direction following a change in the tax rate.24
Proof. In the cooperative case, we have w ≡ 1 and thus ∂w
∂t = 0, implying















w + ΦwS] ∂w
∂t
￿




1−t (see (4) ), we have


















revenues are given by tR, R + tRt is the derivative of tax revenues wrt. the tax rate.





, countries acting non-
cooperatively face lower marginal costs of public funds for a given tax rate25 26. This has important
implications for optimal tax rates, since
Proposition 12 The optimal tax in the cooperate case is zero, while it is positive in the non-
cooperative case.
Proof. The ﬁrst part follows directly from standard economic theory. The second part follows
from noting either MCPF |non−coop,t=0= −Φw
Φ
∂w
∂t < 0 or UBBt|t=0 = ΦwS ∂w
∂t > 0
This is a striking result since the case considered here is designed to focus on the distortionary
eﬀect (ξ = 1), and yet we ﬁnd that the optimal tax rate is positive in the non-cooperative case.
The intuition is that non-cooperative policy makers perceive that they by choosing a positive tax
rate can turn the terms of trade to their advantage27 (a similar eﬀect is found in the literature
on optimal tariﬀs etc.). No such eﬀect is present in the cooperative case, and therefore the
non-cooperative tax rate exceeds the cooperative tax rate in a pure tax-transfer scheme. In a
symmetric equilibrium, there are no improvements in the terms of trade, and thus from a social
24If the Laﬀer curves are single peaked, this corresponds to being on the same side of the curves.
25However, the marginal costs of a common increase in the revenue constraint are of course the same in the two
scenarios.
26In the non-cooperative case, we consider a unilateral increase in the revenue constraint, i.e. an increase in ˆ T
for a given ˆ T∗.
27In fact, if Φw
Φ
∂w
∂t > 1, i.e. if the terms of trade eﬀect is suﬃciently strong (∂w
∂t ) or suﬃciently important to
consumption (Φw
Φ ), the government in the non-cooperative case has an incentive to collect taxes and destroy the
resources (if redistribution is not possible).
18point of view, tax rates are too high in the non-cooperative case. This result complements the
literature pointing to an upward bias in non-cooperative public policies due to a home bias in
public consumption in models with exogenous specialization, cf. introduction. Here, we ﬁnd a
similar bias for transfers in a case with endogenous specialization and where the preferences of
the public sector over domestic and foreign produced goods do not play a role.
6 Optimal level of public consumption
The determination of the optimal level of public consumption is more complicated since it involves
the direct utility eﬀects and the consequences of tax ﬁnancing hereof, and therefore also in turn
how these factors are aﬀected by further integration. Does integration necessarily lead to a re-
trenchment of public sector activities? We consider this issue in two steps. First, we consider the
cooperative outcome to clarify the basic mechanisms through which trade and integration aﬀect
the level of public sector activities. Next, we consider the non-cooperative case and compare it to
the cooperative case to clarify the spill-over eﬀects involved.
In the present set-up with a representative consumer, the relevant issue is the level of public
service provision (ξ = 0), and we take the tax rate (t) to be the policy instrument28. We assume a
utilitarian social planner, and for ξ = 0 we have that private and public consumption can written,
respectively, as
B(w,t,m) = Φ(w,m)[1 − t]S(w,t,m) + V (1 − S(w,t,m))
G(w,t,m) = tS(w,t,m)
6.1 Optimal ﬁscal policies - the cooperative case
In the cooperative case, t = t∗ and the relative wage is constant (w = 1), and the optimal tax rate
is determined by the following conditions
−UBBt = UGGt (14)
0 > UBBB
2
t + UBBtt + UBGBtGt + UGBGtBt + UGGG
2
t + UGGtt (15)
where
Bt = −ΦS < 0
Gt = S + tSt ⋚ 0
The cost of raising taxes measured in terms of the private consumption bundle Bt is unambiguously
negative, while the eﬀect of a change in the tax rate on public consumption Gt is ambiguous due
28In the non-cooperative case redistribution could be optimal if marginal utility of public consumption is suﬃ-
ciently low. We assume this is not the case.
19to a positive direct eﬀect and a negative indirect eﬀect (due to a reduction in private sector
employment). The condition (14) is thus giving the Samuelson condition for the determination
of the optimal level of public consumption as the marginal costs (the LHS of (14)) equal to the
marginal beneﬁts (the RHS of (14)).
To see how integration aﬀects the optimal level of public consumption, it is useful to rewrite
(14) in terms of the marginal costs of public funds. Using that the public sector budget constraint








and hence the condition determining optimal public consumption can be rewritten
UG = Φ MCPF UB
This condition says that the optimal level of public consumption is determined where the marginal
beneﬁts of public consumption (the LHS of the expression) is equal to its marginal costs (the RHS
of the expression) which is the product of the real cost of hiring an additional public employee
times the marginal costs of raising this funds times the marginal utility of private consumption
measuring the opportunity costs of giving up private consumption possibilities. Considering the
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∂MCPF
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The right hand side of this expression gives how the marginal costs of public consumption is
aﬀected by integration. It includes the following three eﬀects.
(i) a cost eﬀect: ∂Φ
∂m > 0, i.e. with more integration the real wage goes up, and therefore the
cost of public employment goes up in real terms
(ii) a distortion eﬀect: integration aﬀects the MCPF, and if it increases, it makes the collection
of tax revenue more costly and vice versa. In general, ∂MCPF
∂m is ambiguously signed, cf. above29.
(iii) a gains from trade eﬀect: if the marginal utility of private consumption decreases due to
integration, this tends to lower the costs of public consumption and vice versa. An increase in
private consumption tends to work in the direction of lowering the marginal utility of the private
consumption bundle.
Note that the expression above includes a Baumol-eﬀect released by integration. Product
market integration leads to productivity increases for private goods since production becomes
better aligned to comparative advantages (a basic reason for gains from trade). This is the basic
source of the increase in the real wage. However, productivity in production of public services is
unchanged (= 1), and therefore private goods become relatively cheaper to public consumption.
This is captured in the cost eﬀect in the expression above.
29We have that MCPFPublic consumption = MCPFTransfers + 1.
20If preferences are separable in private and public consumption, marginal utility of private
(public) consumption goes down if private (public) consumption goes up. Hence, under this
assumption the level eﬀect on public consumption follows immediately from (16). In the general
case with non-separable preferences, the eﬀects are slightly more complicated due to cross eﬀects
in marginal utilities.30.
In the preceding, we have characterized the optimal policy in terms of public consumption,
but it can also be expressed in terms of the optimal tax rate. However, this is slightly more
complicated. The reason is that since the public sector budget constraint implies Sg = t
1−tSp, it
follows that an increase in public consumption (= Sg) is possible without a higher tax rate. The
reason is that integration increases the tax base, which in turn leads to a revenue increase for a
given tax rate. However, for public consumption relative to private consumption ( Sg
ΦSp) to increase
requires an increase in the tax rate.31
It follows that the eﬀects of product market integration can not be readily inferred from the
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ηG,m + ηBt,m − ηGt,m
￿
This expression32 involves both gains from trade eﬀects, and distortions33.
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For UGG − Φ MCPF UBG < 0, Φ MCPF UBB − UGB < 0, we have the same qualitative predictions as with
separability.
31In fact, as Φm > 0 the tax rate must increase just to keep Sg
ΦSp constant when there is more integration (m
increases), cf. the Baumol-eﬀect mentioned above. However, the tax rate is the only variable aﬀecting the ratio of
public to private expenditures.
32Note this is a generalization of the expression in Andersen (2006) for exogenous production/specialization.








An increase in m corresponds to higher productivity in the private sector. First, the ηUB,B term captures that
higher productivity implies high consumption and low marginal utility. This calls for a higher tax rate. Secondly,
high productivity also implies that private consumption is more responsive to public consumption, which calls for
a low tax (this is captured by the second term).
21First, the term ηB,m > 0 captures the increase in the private consumption bundle accruing with
more integration. The direction in which this aﬀects the optimal tax rate depends on whether
it reduces the marginal beneﬁt of the private consumption bundle or public consumption the
most. If ηUB,B − ηUG,B < 0 (note ηUB,B < 0), we have that the marginal utility of the private
consumption bundle is reduced the most, and this works to increase the tax rate, and vice versa
when ηUB,B − ηUG,B > 0.
Second, the term ηG,m > 0 captures how integration implies a gain in public consumption via a
larger tax base. The eﬀect of this depends on how the marginal utility of the private consumption
bundle is aﬀected relative to the marginal utility of public consumption. If ηUB,G − ηUG,G < 0
(note ηUG,G < 0), the marginal utility of the private consumption bundle falls by more than the
marginal utility of public consumption, and this tends to work in the direction of increasing the
tax rate, and vice versa for ηUB,G − ηUG,G > 0.
Finally, there is a distortion eﬀect which has two elements, namely, how integration inﬂuences
how much a given tax rate reduces the private consumption bundle (Bt), and how it inﬂuences
how much a given tax inﬂuences public consumption. We have that ηBt,m > 0, and this eﬀect
therefore works in the direction of lowering the tax rate, while ηGt,m is ambiguously signed.
6.2 Optimal ﬁscal policies: Non-cooperative vs. cooperative policies
We consider possible spill-over eﬀects in ﬁscal policy by comparing the non-cooperative and co-
operative policy choices. The cooperative solution is already given in the previous sub-section,
cf. (14). The choice of the tax rate in the non-cooperative case is determined by the ﬁrst order
condition




where the marginal eﬀects of a change in the relative wage (w) on private and public consumption,
respectively, are given by
Bw = Φw(1 − t)S > 0
Gw = tSw > 0
Proposition 13 The optimal tax rate in the non-cooperative case is larger than the optimal tax
rate in the cooperative case.
Proof. Comparing the non-cooperative case (17) to the cooperative case (14), we have that





The term captures the eﬀect a change in the tax rate has on the relative wage. It follows that
the marginal costs of public activities are smaller in the non-cooperative than in the cooperative
22case. Consequently, the optimal level of public activity is larger in the non-cooperative than in
the cooperative case.
The expansionary bias arising in the non-cooperative case is caused by policy makers perceiving
that they can turn the terms of trade or the relative wage to their advantage.34 The advantage
arises both from the eﬀect of the terms of trade increase on real income, and the fact that a
higher real wage expands labour supply and thus increases public consumption. Of course this is
not possible in the symmetric equilibrium, and therefore public consumption is too high in the
non-cooperative case.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that even though the production structure is endogenous and a ﬁscal
expansion implies a deterioration of wage competitiveness, an expansionary bias appears in non-
cooperative policies. The reason is that the bias is not related to whether a ﬁscal expansion leads
to an expanded or contracted level of activity but to the perceived gain attained via an improve-
ment in the terms of trade. This generalizes a result well known from models with exogenous
specialization, cf. the introduction.
Finally, since this ﬁnding is controversial it may be questioned whether this result depends
on the assumed utilitarian objective function. In appendix C, we show that the same qualitative
result holds if ﬁscal policy aims at maximizing e.g. real income or total employment.
7 Concluding remarks
In popular debates, it is often taken for granted that globalization makes income taxation more
distortionary. The argument is that taxation deteriorates competitiveness and the importance of
competitiveness increases with globalization. A race to the bottom in income taxation has also
been suggested along these lines. These views are not conﬁrmed in the model above, where taxa-
tion deteriorates competitiveness, globalization reduces trade frictions, and trade and production
structures are endogenous.
The present analysis has shown that the eﬀects of globalization in the form of product market
integration for both the eﬀects of ﬁscal policies and optimal policies are far from obvious. First,
integration may or may not release eﬀects tending to make taxation more distortionary. Second,
even if taxes become more distortionary, we ﬁnd that the gains from trade following integration
work in the direction of lowering marginal costs of public funds. Accordingly, one can not gener-
ally conclude that income taxation would distort employment more with further product market
integration, neither that the marginal costs of public funds go up, nor that optimal policies involve
34Even if UG = 0 optimal public consumption may be positive. In fact, if Φw
Φ
∂w
∂t > 1, i.e. if the terms of trade eﬀect
is suﬃciently strong (∂w
∂t ) or suﬃciently important to consumption (Φw
Φ ), the government in the non-cooperative
case has an incentive to collect taxes and spend the money on useless public consumption (if redistribution is not
possible).
23a retrenchment.
It is a robust ﬁnding of models withan exogenous production and specialization structure across
countries that non-cooperative ﬁscal policies tend to have an expansionary bias. That is, ﬁscal
policy is more expansive in the non-cooperative than in the cooperative case. We have shown that
this insight generalizes to the case where the production/specialization structure is endogenous.
Somewhat provocative, one might conclude from this analysis that the fear of retrenchment in the
public sector due to increased tax competition might as well be replaced with a fear of too large
and expanding public sectors. That said, we must stress that the representative agent framework
applied does not take distributional consequences into account. Gains from increased trade are
unevenly distributed, calling for more redistribution and thus an expanding public sector. Further,
we have not taken mobility of production factors into account.
In the present paper, public sector activities have been modelled in a traditional way including
a standard tax-transfer scheme and tax ﬁnanced public consumption. While capturing basic
eﬀects, it also leaves out important aspects on the interaction between private and public sector
activities. In particular since the model predicts a standard trade-oﬀ between the extent of public
sector activities and distortions. The potential source of interactions between private and public
sector activities most relevant in the present context runs via productivity (relative productivity
is the driver of the Ricardian trade model). Two contrasting views are that public sector activities
and distortions may be detrimental to innovation and therefore lead to lower productivity growth,
or that public sector activities may increase productivity growth via investment in e.g. human
capital and infrastructure. Another important aspect not addressed this paper is the question
of inequality. Gains from trade are often distributed very unevenly, implying that demand for
redistribution increases with product market integration. It is an interesting issue for further
research to address these issues.
Appendix A: Generalization of the private utility bundle
A more general formulation of the private utility bundle is
B = Ψ(C,F)
where leisure F = 1 − L and Ψ is a two times continuously diﬀerentiable function35. The ﬁrst
order condition determining labour supply reads
Υ = ΨC(φ(Q)I,1 − L
s)[1 − t]Wφ(Q) − ΨF(φ(Q)I,1 − L
s) = 0
and the second order condition reads
ΥL = ΨCC [[1 − t]Wφ(Q)]
2 + ΨFF − ΨCF [1 − t]Wφ(Q) − ΨFC [1 − t]Wφ(Q)
= ΨCC [[1 − t]Wφ(Q)]
2 + ΨFF − 2ΨFC [1 − t]Wφ(Q) < 0
35Ψ(C,F) is assumed to have the usual properties: ΨC > 0,ΨF > 0,ΨCC < 0 and ΨFF < 0
24Using the public budget Lp = [1 − [1 − ξ]t]L and φ(Q)I = Wφ(Q)Lp. Insert into the ﬁrst order
condition to get
ˆ Υ = ΨC(Wφ(Q)L
sp,1−
Lsp




1 − [1 − ξ]t
) = 0 (18)
implicitly deﬁning the aggregate labour supply function for the private sector. From the ﬁrst order














1 − [1 − ξ]t
+
ξtWφ(Q)
1 − [1 − ξ]t
[[1 − t]Wφ(Q)ΨCC − ΨFC]   0
ˆ Υt = −ΨCWφ(Q) − ΨCF [1 − t]Wφ(Q)
Lsp [1 − ξ]
[1 − [1 − ξ]t]
2 + ΨFF
Lsp [1 − ξ]
[1 − [1 − ξ]t]
2   0
ˆ ΥWφ(Q) = ΨC [1 − t] + ΨCCL
sp [1 − t]Wφ(Q) − ΨFCL
sp





sp   0
The eﬀects of the real wage and the tax rate on aggregate labour supply for the private sector are
in general ambiguous. However, a suﬃcient condition for aggregate labour supply for the private
sector to be decreasing in the tax rate is that consumption is not a substitute for leisure (ΨFC ≥ 0)
as









Appendix B: The equilibrium allocation and the relative wage




The equilibrium conditions for commodities and labour are
Ci + mC
∗
i = Yi for i > i
E, (19)
Ci = Yi for i





25As noted in section 2, public employment is proportional to private employment. The labour
market equilibrium condition is in the following stated in terms of demand for and supply of
labour to the private sector.
Labour demand
































The ﬁrst part on the RHS is labour demand generated by supplying goods to the domestic market,
and the second part is the labour demand generated by supplying to the foreign market (export).
Insert that prices are given by marginal costs and private income is given by labour income in the




























Note that NH(Q,iH) is the total share of income spent by domestic households on domestic
commodities (1 = NH(Q,iH)+NM(Q,iH)), and N∗M(Q∗,iG) is the share foreign households spend
on domestic commodities. The latter can be interpreted as the trade share36. Exploiting that



















































i for i ≥ iH (24)
36The share is measured relative to total private income I which in equilibrium equals the wage income generated
in the private sector. Hence, the trade share is the "private" sector trade share, rather than the often used trade







i for i = iH, which implies that a marginal change aﬀecting iH would not aﬀect
Q
W .
26As consumer prices relative to the wage can be written as functions of the relative wage and the
trade friction (z) as iH (w








As w and z always enter as w









Hence, if more integration (m) reduces the share of income spent by domestic consumers on





















If an increase in m lowers this share, then an increase in the relative wage will increase this share.







M (w,m) = 1 − ψ
H (w,m). Note that ψ
M (1,m) = ψ
∗M (1,m).
Real wage
Using homogeneity of the φ-function and the relation between prices and wages given in (24),








>From (24) and homogeneity, it follows that the real wage is increasing in the relative wage and








For any commodity i, activity is demand determined due to the constant returns to scale















for i ≥ i
E (28)
27and this gives rise to a needed amount of labour 1
AiDi. Hence, when aggregating labour demand
for the speciﬁc commodities into the aggregate labour demand relation (22) and ensuring equality
between labour demand and supply, it follows that the overall employment level is consistent
with having the available labour needed for production of all goods demanded at the equilibrium
relative wage. In short, when the labour market is in equilibrium for a given relative wage, it
follows that all product markets by construction are also in equilibrium.
Labour market equilibrium
Consider ﬁrst labour supply (4). Using that public labour demand Lg = (1 − ξ)tL and
φ(Q)W = Φ(w,m), we have that labour supply to the private sector can be written as
S
p = [1 − [1 − ξ]t]S (Φ(w,m)[1 − t]) (29)
≡ S
p(w,ξ,t,m)
Quasilinearity of the private consumption bundle ensures that labour supply is increasing in the






















For a given relative wage, it follows that the trade structure is determined (via iH and iE) and
the level of production of all goods i follows from (27,28), the real wage follows from (26) and
employment follows from (22).
Appendix C: Non-cooperative policy bias and alternative objective
functions
The results in section 6 were derived assuming that the policy maker is utilitarian. In the
following, we consider alternative political objective functions to show that the main result on the
bias in non-cooperative policies does not depend on the particular objective function.
Real income
Real income is given as
Φ(w,m)S
p (w,ξ,t,m)










Hence, the bias depends on the relative wage eﬀect, and with the same sign as in the case considered
in the main body of the paper.
Employment























Hence, the bias depends on the relative wage eﬀect, and with the same sign as in the case considered
in the main body of the paper.
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